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Preverbal infants expect agents 
exhibiting counterintuitive 
capacities to gain access 
to contested resources
Xianwei Meng1,2,3,8*, Yo Nakawake1,4,5,8*, Kazuhide Hashiya1, Emily Burdett5,6,7, 
Jonathan Jong5,6 & Harvey Whitehouse5*
Claims to supernatural power have been used as a basis for authority in a wide range of societies, 
but little is known about developmental origins of the link between supernatural power and worldly 
authority. Here, we show that 12- to 16-month-old infants expect agents exhibiting counterintuitive 
capacities to win out in a two-way standoff over a contested resource. Infants watched two agents 
gain a reward using either physically intuitive or physically counterintuitive methods, the latter 
involving simple forms of levitation or teleportation. Infants looked longer, indicating surprise, when 
the physically intuitive agent subsequently outcompeted a physically counterintuitive agent in 
securing a reward. Control experiments indicated that infants’ expectations were not simply motived 
by the efficiency of agents in pursuing their goals, but specifically the deployment of counterintuitive 
capacities. This suggests that the link between supernatural power and worldly authority has early 
origins in development.
Positions of authority in human societies may derive, at least in part, from claims to supernatural  power1,2. 
Examples range from diviners, shamans, and witch-doctors in small-scale  societies3–5 to god-kings of archaic 
 states6 and the divinely sanctioned powers of rulers of Axial Age social formations and the world religions they 
 spawned7,8. Little is known, however, about the nature of the link between authority and supernatural power, 
and still less about its developmental origins.
Supernatural power attribution commonly entails capacities to efficiently achieve goals by counterintuitive 
methods violating intuitive physics (e.g., levitation), biology (e.g., healing) and psychology (e.g., mind read-
ing)9–12. Supernatural powers based on physically counterintuitive capacities feature frequently in folktales and 
myths. For example, the motif of “magical transportation” can be found in Eskimo, Icelandic, Indian, Irish, Jew-
ish and Spanish myths and folktales, while the motif of “human levitation” has been recorded in Irish, Jewish, 
Hindu and Indo-Chinese Buddhist  traditions13–15. In many of these cultures, individuals attributed with such 
capacities occupy higher social status allowing them to exercise authority in worldly matters. The current study 
investigates the developmental origin of the link between social dominance and physically counterintuitive 
capacities by testing whether infants expect agents who effectively achieve goals by means violating intuitive 
physics to gain access to contested resources. Although there is evidence of an early emerging sensitivity both 
to social  dominance16–21 and to events violating intuitive understanding of the physical  world22–27, no previous 
research has explored the relationship between them.
Intuitive physics is one of the earliest developing ontological domains in  cognition22. Empirical studies using 
behavioral (e.g., looking behaviour) and neuropsychological (e.g., brain electrical activity) measures have repeat-
edly shown that infants in the first year demonstrate surprise in response to physically counterintuitive events 
(e.g., objects suspended in mid-air with no apparent source of support), suggesting that they expect an object to 
follow intuitive physical principles such as  gravity22–31. (Note that some researchers prefer to interpret the specific 
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response (e.g., longer looking time) to physically counterintuitive events as indicative of ‘violation of expectation’ 
rather than of ‘surprise’ but we have adopted the latter terminology here to avoid unnecessary jargon.) Stahl and 
 Feigenson23 presented 11-month-old infants with examples of objects that levitate (contrary to expectations of 
intuitive gravity) or teleport from one location to another without moving through space (contrary to intuitions 
regarding object continuity), and found that infants show preferential interest in exploring the properties of 
such objects. Furthermore, infants seem to apply intuitive physical principles not only in real world settings, but 
also in imaginary environments. Animated stimuli have been widely used in studies of infants’ cognition, partly 
because their superficial perceptual properties can be easily controlled. These studies show that 6-month-old 
infants mentally represent the occluded  object26,27, 7- to 8-month-old infants perceive an object’s lightness in 
shadows by using an assumption that cast shadows dim the surface of an  object32, 9-month-old infants apply 
principles of object solidity and  cohesion25, and 12- to 16-month-old infants predict the outcome of a zero-sum 
conflict between two agents based on their previous spatial high- or low-  positions20. Further, before their first 
birthday infants infer agents’ needs, goals and the costs of their actions in ways that take into account a wide 
range of physical constraints (e.g., gravity, friction, height, barriers, trenches)25,33–35. This extensive empirical 
literature demonstrates that intuitive physical principles emerge early in development, and infants expect events 
to follow these principles, both in physical and animated (e.g., in 3D) environments.
Studies using animated stimuli have also shown that preverbal human infants form dominance hierarchies 
where some systematically supplant other in zero-sum  conflict21. For example, 6–9-month-old infants utilize 
number of allies, 9–13-month old infants utilize cues such as body-size, to predict which individuals will yield 
and prevail in the right-of-way dominance  paradigm16,17. Twelve to 16-month old infants expect individuals in 
higher spatial location to gain contested  resources20. Twelve-month-old infants expect hierarchical relationships 
in animated dyads to be stable over  time19. These findings suggest that preverbal infants represent and evaluate 
relative social power and status based on various cues.
In the present study we consider whether physically counterintuitive capacities—capacities to achieve goals 
efficiently by physically counterintuitive methods—could serve as a cue for expectations of social dominance 
to prevail when two agents have conflicting  goals36 (see other related  studies16,17,19,20,37,38). In four experiments 
based on the violation-of-expectation paradigm, an extensively used method in infancy research that relies 
on looking time as an index of  surprise29,39,40, we investigated 12- to 16-month-old infants’ looking time using 
animated videos in which two agents compete for a reward in a zero-sum situation (test phase)19,20 after the 
agents had retrieved a reward by overcoming an obstacle by different  methods23 (familiarization phase; Fig. 1). 
Past studies have shown that young infants may regard animated geometric figures, for example, as agents 
with goal-directed intentions and preferences, capable of engaging in social interactions such as cooperation 
and  interference20,33,34,41. Infants attributing social dominance to agents exhibiting physically counterintuitive 
capacities, should expect an agent who achieved goals by physically intuitive methods to withdraw and allow an 
agent who achieved goals efficiently by physically counterintuitive methods to obtain the reward. Accordingly, 
infants in the test phase should look longer at the screen (indicating surprise) after seeing a physically intuitive 
agent secure a reward in competition with a physically counterintuitive agent, as compared with scenarios in 
which the physically counterintuitive agent secures the reward in competition with an intuitive agent. Looking 
time following each test outcome thus served as the main dependent variable in our experimental  design16,17,19,20. 
Looking times were measured as the time interval between the time point when an agent took the reward and 
the time point infants began to consecutively look away for 2 s or the outcome has been frozen for 60  s20 (see 
“Coding and analysis” for detailed criterion).
Experiments 1 and 3 confirmed the above prediction by showing that infants looked longer at the screen 
after they saw a physically intuitive agent secure a reward in competition with an agent who violated intuitive 
physical principles of gravity (Exp 1) or continuity (Exp3). Further control experiments (Exp 2, 4) indicated that 
infants’ expectations were not simply motived by the efficiency of agents in pursuing their goals, but specifically 
the deployment of counterintuitive capacities. Infants did not show longer looking times when a physically 
intuitive agent secured a reward in competition with an agent who achieved goals more effectively by physically 
expected methods. These findings indicate that infants expect agents exhibiting counterintuitive capacities to 
gain access to contested resources.
Results
Experiment 1. In Experiment 1 we considered a “levitation” event violating infant intuitive understanding 
of object  supports28,30. In the familiarization phase, infants (N = 24) repeatedly watched two separate events in 
which each agent crossed a low valley to achieve their goal. In one event, the physically counterintuitive agent 
appeared to float through the air to cross a valley (thus violating the physical principle of intuitive gravity in 
which unsupported objects are expected to fall earthwards; see Movie S5). By contrast, in the other event, a 
physically intuitive agent walked down and up the same valley (see Movie S4) in order to collect the reward.
In the subsequent test phase, infants watched two video stimuli, with either one of the two agents from the 
familiarization phase gaining a zero-sum reward. Both agents appeared on either side of the screen, moved toward 
the reward, stopped, looked at each other, and then moved forward again toward each other. We introduced 
the action of the second forward-movement as a threatening signal to other agent, implying intention to enter 
into conflict. Then, after one agent again moved forward slightly, the other agent took a step backward with an 
averted gaze while saying “Hmmm…” in a disappointed tone. Subsequently the former agent took the object to 
the side it came from, stopped and lightly jumped while saying “Ahah!” in a positive tone. Then the video paused 
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Results of the familiarization phase showed that more socially directed gaze—looking back to the caregiver’s 
face when infants were watching the events—were observed in counterintuitive trials (M = 0.71, SD = 0.91) than 
intuitive ones (M = 0.25, SD = 0.53; t(23) = 2.54, p = 0.018, d = 0.519), suggesting that infants were surprised by 
violations of intuitive gravity (Fig. 2; visual exposure to the events was reported in SI).
Results of test phase showed that infants looked significantly longer when a physically intuitive agent secured 
the reward (M = 22.95 s, SD = 13.41) than when a physically counterintuitive agent did so (M = 15.73 s, SD = 7.89; 
t(23) = 2.33, p = 0.029, d = 0.475; Fig. 3). Post-hoc analysis tested whether social looks in the familiarization related 
to differentiated looking time in the test phase. We found larger looking time difference toward the two test 
outcomes (longer looking time on physically intuitive agent dominant tests) in infants who showed more social 
looks toward the counterintuitive events than the intuitive ones, compared to other infants (t(22) = 2.57, p = 0.017, 
d = 1.114). Together, these findings are consistent to our hypothesis that infants expect agents achieved goals 
efficiently by physically counterintuitive methods to gain access to contested resources.
However, one possible explanation of the result is that infants expected the physically counterintuitive agent 
to obtain the reward merely because the agent proceeded more efficiently through the landscape simulated in 
the video (this agent moved in a straight line, which was the shortest distance to the reward) which does not 
require the counterintuitive property of defying gravity. To exclude this explanation, we conducted Experiment 
2, a control experiment to Experiment 1.
Experiment 2. Experiment 2 (N = 24) used videos depicting the same events as Experiment 1 except that 
there was a bridge above the valley for the agents to cross (see Movies S6, S7). In this version of the experiment, 
although the efficient agent moved in a straight line toward the reward (the same trajectory display with the 
counterintuitive agent in the Experiment 1), this agent crossed the valley via a bridge without violating infants’ 
intuitive expectations about gravity. If the findings of Experiment 1 merely reflect an association between effi-
ciency of the goal-achievements in the familiarization phase and the outcome of conflicts in the test phase, then 
we would expect infant look longer when the inefficient agent obtained the reward than when the efficient agent 
did so.
For the familiarization phase, in contrast to Experiment 1, number of social looks was rare during both events 
(Minefficient event = 0.21, SD = 0.42; Mefficient event = 0.21, SD = 0.51), which did not differ from each other (t(23) = 0.00, 
Figure 1.  The procedure of the experiments. In the familiarization phase of Exp 1 and 3, a pair of agents gain 
a reward using either a physically intuitive or physically counterintuitive method. The latter was more efficient 
because the agents move in a straight line, which was the shortest distance to the reward (Exp 1), or disappear 
before each bump and quickly reappear after it, which leads faster goal-achievement (Exp 3). In Exp 2 and 4, 
both agents obtained the reward by moving in trajectories and speed identical to Exp 1 and 3 using physically 
intuitive methods (Exp 2, 4). Dotted lines present the trajectory displays of the agents (the lines do not exist in 
the videos), which are the same between Exp 1 and 2, and between Exp 3 and 4. In the test phase, either of the 
agent from the same pair of familiarization phase gains a zero-sum reward.
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Figure 2.  Number of social looks in the familiarization phase of Experiment 1 and 2. Intuitive = intuitive events: 
physically intuitive and inefficient goal-achievement events, counterintuitive = physically counterintuitive and 
efficient goal-achievement events, inefficient = inefficient and physically intuitive goal-achievement events, 
efficient = efficient and physically intuitive goal-achievement events. Error bars present the standard errors 
(*p < 0.05).
Figure 3.  Average looking time for when either agent obtains the reward in Experiments 1–4. Diamonds 
indicate the means of the original looking time (not log-transformed). The horizontal line of boxes indicates 
upper quarterly, median and lower quarterly. Grey dots indicate looking time linked with a grey line for the 
same infant (within-participant). Whiskers indicate 1.5 interquartile range of upper and lower quarterly, and 
data that did not fit in the range was circled in red (*p < 0.05).
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p = 1.000, d = 0.000; Fig. 2). An ANOVA on number of social looks with event type (physically counterintuitive or 
efficient events/physically intuitive or inefficient events) as within-subject factor and experiment (Exp 1/Exp 2) 
as between-subjects factors revealed a significant interaction (F(1, 46) = 4.15, p = 0.047, ηp2 = 0.083): infants showed 
more social looks during physically counterintuitive events than physically intuitive events (Exp 1; p = 0.018), but 
the number of social looks did not differ from each other when infants were watching the efficient events and 
the inefficient ones (Exp 2; p = 1.000). These suggest that infants were surprised by agents suspended in mid-air 
with no apparent source of support, but not by other agents moving with physical supports.
There was no significant difference between looking time for the two test trials (Minefficient agent dominant = 15.85 s, 
SD = 8.76; Mefficient agent dominant = 16.67 s, SD = 11.14; t(23) = 0.51, p = 0.613, d = 0.105; Fig. 3). An ANOVA on the look-
ing time with event type (physically counterintuitive or efficient/physically intuitive or inefficient agent obtained 
the reward) as within-subject factor and experiment (Exp 1/Exp 2) as between-subjects factors tested the effect 
of the interaction (F(1, 46) = 3.81, p = 0.057, ηp2 = 0.077): infants tended to look longer when the physically intuitive 
agent obtained the reward than when the physically counterintuitive agent did so (Exp 1; p = 0.029), but there 
was no difference in looking time when both agents could be considered as physically intuitive, even though one 
agent was more efficient than the other (Exp 2; p = 0.613).
Results of Experiment 1 and 2 indicated that although infants expect agents exhibiting efficient goal-achieve-
ment by physically counterintuitive methods to prevail in zero-sum conflict over contested resources, they do 
not have the same expectations for agents who might be considered as merely more efficient. Furthermore, in 
Experiment 2, the less efficient agent should evince greater surprise given that it would be more rational for agents 
to take the shorter  course35, but this had no measurable effect on expectation of social dominance on contested 
resources. This suggests that social dominance attribution is not due to a simple surprise without physically 
counterintuitive capacities.
To increase the reliability of the results so far and confirm that the previous findings were not limited to the 
stimuli as well as intuitive gravity, we conducted Experiment 3 using a novel context in which the physically 
counterintuitive agent violated the physical rule of object  continuity23,27,29.
Experiment 3. In Experiment 3 (N = 24), two bumps in the virtual landscape were inserted to serve as 
obstacles. To collect the reward by physically expected means, the agent needs to climb over the two bumps to 
reach the reward (see Movie S8), whereas the physically counterintuitive agent disappears before each bump and 
quickly reappears after it (the “teleportation” method; see Movie S9). The latter agent requires shorter time to 
obtain the reward and thus can be considered as more efficient than the former agent. As in Experiment 1, we 
predicted that infants expect the counterintuitive agent to outcompete the intuitive agent in securing the reward 
in the test phase.
During the familiarization phase, number of social looks toward caregivers were similar when infants 
were watching physically intuitive videos (M = 0.25, SD = 0.53) and physically counterintuitive ones (M = 0.08, 
SD = 0.28; t(23) = 1.70, p = 0.103, d = 0.346). Because social looking toward the counterintuitive events rarely 
occurred, we did not test whether the number of social looks in the familiarization phase related to looking 
times in the test phase. Results of the test phase showed that looking time was significantly longer when a 
physically intuitive agent procured the reward (M = 19.87 s, SD = 13.40) than when a physically counterintuitive 
agent did so (M = 14.46 s, SD = 9.11; t(23) = 2.46, p = 0.022, d = 0.502; Fig. 3). Again, the result is consistent to our 
hypothesis that infants expect agents achieved goals efficiently by physically counterintuitive methods to gain 
access to contested resources.
One might argue that the infants did not perceive the physically counterintuitive agent as counterintuitive, 
as social looks (indicating surprise) were rarely observed during the observation of the counterintuitive event. 
However, this might be because the duration of agents’ disappearance was too short so that infants did not have 
enough time to look back to caregivers as they needed to follow the ongoing sequence of the video, and/or infants 
needed to search for the disappeared agents and thus had no time to look back. As the current data did not allow 
to clarify the possibilities, we designed a control experiment (Experiment 4) to test whether the physically coun-
terintuitive property is required for the expectation of social dominance on contested resources in Experiment 3.
Experiment 4. In Experiment 4 (N = 24), the physically counterintuitive event was modified so that the 
agents’ disappearance and re-appearance can be perceived as physically intuitive because the agents were 
occluded from view by two grey  boards26,27 (see Movies S10, S11). The agent therefore still moved with trajectory 
displays and speed that were identical to that of Experiment 3, but would not be perceived as violating intuitive 
expectations about object  continuity23,27,29. If the findings of Experiment 3 merely reflect an association between 
efficiency of the goal-achievements in familiarization phase and the outcome of conflicts in test phase, then we 
would expect infant look longer when the inefficient agent obtained the reward than when the efficient agent did 
so. Otherwise, infants should have no expectation on the outcome of the zero-sum conflict.
During the familiarization phase, number of social looks toward caregivers were similar when infants were 
watching the inefficient events (M = 0.21, SD = 0.51) and the efficient ones (M = 0.25, SD = 0.53; t(23) = 0.33, 
p = 0.747, d = 0.067). In contrast to Experiment 3, results of the test phase showed that infants’ looking time did not 
differ after either agent secured the reward (Minefficient agent dominant = 17.93 s, SD = 11.09; Mefficient agent dominant = 18.82 s, 
SD = 8.40; t(23) = 0.73, p = 0.472, d = 0.149; Fig. 3). An ANOVA on the looking time with event type (physically 
counterintuitive or efficient/physically intuitive or inefficient agent obtain the reward) as within-subject fac-
tor and experiment (Exp 3/Exp 4) as between-subjects factors revealed a significant interaction (F(1, 46) = 5.58, 
p = 0.022, ηp2 = 0.108): infants looked longer when the physically intuitive agent obtained the reward than when 
the physically counterintuitive agent did so (Exp 3; p = 0.022), but there was no difference in looking time when 
both agents could be considered as physically intuitive (Exp 4; p = 0.472).
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Overall analysis of all experiments. We merged all data of four experiments and conducted a three-way 
ANOVA on looking times in test phase with test outcome (physically intuitive or inefficient/physically counter-
intuitive or efficient agent obtain the reward) as within-subject factor, and domain type (gravity/continuity) and 
experimental condition (manipulation/control) as between-subjects factors. The analysis revealed a significant 
effect of the interaction of the test outcome and experimental condition (F(1, 92) = 9.39, p = 0.003, ηp2 = 0.093; SI, 
Tables S2–S4). As predicted, although infants expect agents exhibiting efficient goal-achievement by physically 
counterintuitive methods to gain access to contested resources (Exp 1 and 3, p = 0.002), they do not have the 
same expectations for agents who might be considered as merely more efficient (Exp 2 and 4, p = 0.382; Analyses 
reported in SI indicate that removing outliers of looking time does not influence the results). These results sup-
ported our hypothesis that physically counterintuitive capacities could serve as a cue for expectations of social 
dominance in 12-to 16-month-old infants.
Further analysis of infants’ visual exposure to the videos in the familiarization phase shows that physi-
cally intuitive (or inefficient) events in the familiarization phase evinced longer duration of fixation in all four 
experiments, irrespective of experimental condition (see SI for detailed analysis). Therefore, our finding that 
social dominance attribution only occurs in the experimental condition but not the control condition cannot 
be attributed to longer perceptual exposure to the physically intuitive (or inefficient) events in familiarization.
Discussion
The study investigated whether 12- to 16-month-old infants expect agents exhibiting counterintuitive capacities 
to gain access to contested resources. Infants watched animated videos in which two agents gain a reward using 
either a physically intuitive or physically counterintuitive method, the latter involving more efficient actions that 
violate constraints of gravity and object coherence and continuity that are intuitively ascribed to the ontological 
domain of physical objects (Exp 1 and 3). Results showed that infants looked longer when the physically intui-
tive agent subsequently outcompeted a physically counterintuitive agent in securing a reward. Further control 
experiments demonstrated that the differentiated looking behavior was absent when both agents obtained the 
reward by moving in trajectories and speed identical to the previous experiments but in physically intuitive ways 
(Exp 2 and 4). Based on the violation-of-expectation  paradigm29,39,40, we consider the results as evidence indicat-
ing that infants expect agents exhibiting counterintuitive capacities to gain access to contested resources, and 
more importantly, the expectation was not simply motived by greater efficiency of the actions alone, but requires 
counterintuitive properties of the actions. Together, this study provides the first empirical evidence suggesting 
that preverbal infants link social dominance to physically counterintuitive capacities.
Past research has shown that very young infants are sensitive to and evaluating hierarchical relations among 
other individuals by various cues (e.g., spatial location)16–21,38. However, little is known by what attitude infants are 
evaluating the high-ranked individuals. It has been suggested that social power could be distinguished into two 
types: fear-based (e.g., high-ranked individuals threatening low-ranked individuals by using physical violence) 
and respect-based (e.g., high-ranked individuals have prestige for outstanding ability)42–45. Interestingly, even 
young children seem to distinguish between these types as “leaders” and “bullies”46. In the present experimental 
contexts, agents did not interact with each other during the familiarization process, and they did not come into 
physical contact with each other during the test phase (the subordinates yielded the resource to the dominant 
agents). Thus, we expect infants to be more likely to perceive the agents exhibiting physically counterintuitive 
capacities as respect-based target than as fear-based  target20,37,47.
As the lack of the physical contact, one may argue that it is not clear whether infants saw the test events 
as competitive interactions or as cooperative interactions (an act of kindness from the agent who let another 
agent to take the resource). Although it is hard to perfectly distinguish between these accounts by experimental 
manipulations because it is difficult to establish precisely how infants are evaluating the interaction of the agents. 
However, note that in our stimuli, both the agents moved toward the reward, stopped, looked at each other, and 
then approached each other  again20. We introduced the second approach to indicate both agents’ willingness to 
engage in conflict, which is obviously different from the form of interactions in which a kind helper intends to 
help someone to achieve a  goal48. Therefore, even though the subordinate finally yields, we think that it is difficult 
to interpret this as an act of kindness. However, further studies may explore whether it is theoretically reasonable 
to predict that people expect intuitive agents to be “more kind” than counterintuitive agents.
Results of social looks in Experiment 1 and 2 suggested that infants were surprised by agents violating expecta-
tions of intuitive gravity, but not by other agents moving with physical supports. Moreover, the contrasting results 
of the experimental condition (Exp 1, 3) and the control condition (Exp 2, 4) also indicated that expectations of 
social dominance were not simply motived by greater efficiency of the actions alone, but by the counterintuitive 
properties of the actions. At first glance, there seems to be a possible alternative explanation that infants were 
surprised to discover that an agent has enough internal force to hover in mid-air, like a bird, without assuming 
that this agent violates physical principles. However, the claim that levitation/teleportation are results of “agents’ 
internal power” is unconvincing. What is “internal power” in this context, if not the counterintuitive ability to 
violate expectations of intuitive physics? Assumption of any kinds of ‘internal power’ should be driven by the 
deviation between the observed phenomenon and the intuitive calculation about the phenomenon based on 
knowledge and beliefs. While birds and planes may be commonly encountered and unsurprising, that does not 
mean that they are not also counterintuitive in the strict sense of violating intuitive expectations in the physical 
ontological domain according to which unsupported objects should move earthwards and objects should move 
in continuous paths.
To reduce the influence of the caregivers on infants’ behavior, we instructed caregivers not to interact with 
infants during the experiment. We did not instruct caregivers to close their eyes or to wear a pair of opaque 
glasses for the duration of the study. We reasoned that being able to observe what is happening during the 
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experiment would be reassuring to caregivers. In previous tests, when caregivers had been asked to close their 
eyes to reduce experimental noise, most nevertheless continued to keep their eyes  open20. We further reasoned 
that allowing caregivers to keep their eyes open might elicit higher rates of social looking in the familiarization 
 phase49. We acknowledge the risk, however, that infants’ looking behavior was influenced by caregivers’ con-
scious/unconscious response towards the stimuli. Future studies should test whether caregivers’ knowledge of 
the stimuli affects infants’ behavior in intuition–violation studies on early social cognition.
The present study tested whether observing efficiently goal-directed events that violate intuitive gravity and 
continuity trigger expectations of social dominance. This investigation was prompted by previous research 
suggesting that young infants have early emerging intuitive expectations in the domain of  physics22–24,27–31, that 
violations of these core expectations serve as a fundamental feature of supernatural agent constructs, and that 
supernatural agents are sometimes ascribed positions of  authority13–15. Previous research with adults has shown 
that some supernatural constructs, for example involving simple breaches of intuitive expectations in a particular 
domain (e.g. person who levitates) are less cognitively taxing than others, for example involving transfers across 
ontological domains (e.g., the transformation of a frog into a stone), making the latter more  surprising50. Such 
constructs should also be mobilized in studies with infants to see if they are capable of driving even stronger 
expectations on social dominance. Moreover, our study focuses only on violations of intuitive physics, whereas 
violations of other intuitive domains such as psychology (e.g., “Omniscient of a God”) or biology (e.g., “Immor-
tality”) are also common motifs in mythical stories and  religions13–15,51, and worthy of further exploration in 
studies of early reasoning about supernatural agents. For instance, one may want to test whether infants attribute 
social dominance to an agent who falsely believes a toy was in a wrong location but can always find the  toy52. 
Finally, in order to understand the psychological mechanisms linking counterintuitive qualities to expectations 
of social dominance, future research should test a broader range of experimental manipulations, for example 
by exploring whether a merely counterintuitive display, without (efficient) goal-achievements, similarly elicits 
expectations of social dominance. The current study did not test the simply effect of counterintuitive proper-
ties because we think that it is hardly to theoretically build a general argument about the relationship between 
counterintuition and social dominance without considering the meaning of counterintuitive properties to goal-
achievements. Counterintuitive agents would not always seen as more powerful than agents who do not violate 
intuitive principles (e.g., a mind trapped in a statue is counter-intuitive, whereas we would not expect it to be 
more powerful over an entity controlling a moving body). We predict that counterintuitive properties can be 
seen as a source of social power only insofar as they make agents more likely to achieve their goals. The possibly 
is worth further investigations.
In addition, there is considerable scope for future developmental studies to explore a wider range of expecta-
tions prompted by counterintuitive attributes. For example, do infants expect agents exhibiting counterintui-
tive capacities to be, not only socially dominant in zero-sum conflict over contested resources, but also more 
knowledgeable, trustworthy, competent, or prosocial? It is important to investigate these possible outcome vari-
ables because, although there is considerable evidence from anthropology that humans possessing (seemingly) 
supernatural powers are commonly expected to exhibit a range of social skills distinguishing them from lesser 
mortals, little is known about the developmental origins of these expectations.
The connection between supernatural power and authority has been observed universally and throughout 
 history1–8. Our finding that possession of physically counterintuitive capacities motivate expectations of social 
dominance at such an early stage of development suggests that this is a fundamental feature of human nature. 
This does not necessarily mean that the link between supernatural power and social dominance is an evolved 
adaptation, given that the religious thought itself may plausibly be a multiple by-product of the normal operation 
of human  cognition53,54. Nevertheless, infants’ evaluation bias observed in the current study would not only help 
to explain the ubiquity of the link between supernatural agency and authority in human societies over the ages 
but would also suggest that this link may be difficult to eradicate in the longer run despite the rise of secularism 
in some regions of the world in recent history.
Methods
Participants. Each of the four experiments included a final sample of 24 12- to 16-months old infants 
(see Participants in SI for the power analysis and data exclusion). The mean age of participants was 14 months 
and 4  days in Experiment 1 (SD = 43.92  days; 15 girls and 9 boys), 14  months and 5  days in Experiment 2 
(SD = 43.50 days, 13 girls and 11 boys), 14 months and 24 days in Experiment 3 (SD = 45.20 days, 13 girls and 
11 boys), and 15 months and 1 days in Experiment 4 (SD = 48.1 days; 14 girls and 10 boys). Written consent was 
obtained from all caregivers before the experiment. All participants were recruited and tested at the BabyLab in 
Kyushu University Hospital. The study was approved by the ethical committee of Kyushu University (2017-012), 
and was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Set-up. All experiments were conducted in a partitioned space in a quiet room (SI, Set-up). Infants were 
seated on the lap of the caregivers who were seated on a floor pillow, 145 cm away from a 55-in. television on 
which the visual and audio stimuli were  presented20. Four video cameras recorded the experiment from the dif-
ferent angles. Outside the booth, two experimenters controlled the stimuli presentation and undertook online 
coding. Role-sharing ensured that the experimenters were blind to the experimental conditions: the experi-
menter who controlled or coded the test phase did not possess prior knowledge about the agents’ conditions 
(e.g., physically counterintuitive).
Stimuli and procedure. The experiments used 3D animated video stimuli created in  Blender55 (2.79b, 
Blender Foundation; https:// www. blend er. org/), synchronized with custom audio tracks in Final Cut Pro X (Ver-
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sion 10.2, Apple Inc.; https:// www. apple. com/ jp/ final- cut- pro/). 3D videos created by Blender or other game 
engines have previously been used in studies of infant studies including the studies to test infant’s intuitive 
understanding of the physical  world20,33,56. Stimuli were presented to participants as animation movies of agents 
(geometrical figure with two eyes and on nose). One pair included a red agent and a blue agent; the other 
included an orange agent and a green agent. All of the agents were of the same size (e.g., the height and width 
of the cube agent was 7.5 cm and 9 cm). Each infant watched animated videos featuring one of these pairs dur-
ing familiarization and test phases; pairs, as well as the identities of the agents, were counterbalanced between 
subjects (SI, Stimuli pattern).
The movie of all experiments mainly consists of three parts: the warm-up phase, the familiarization phase 
and the test phase (SI, Design). The warm-up phase was identical in all experiments, and aimed to familiarize 
infants to the competitive context of the test phase (e.g., video freezes after one of the agents has obtained the 
reward; SI, Stimuli and procedure).
In the familiarization phase, the infant watched two agents obtain the reward by using different methods (see 
Fig. 1, SI, Stimuli and procedure). During each trial of the familiarization phase, a cube-shaped reward fell down 
on one side of the stage. Then one of the paired agents appeared from the other side of the stage. The agent then 
began to move while overcoming a physical obstacle (i.e., crossed a valley), collected the reward, went back, and 
then exited the screen from the side it appeared. The sides on which the object/agent appeared were counter-
balanced (SI, Stimuli pattern). The events in the familiarization phase differed by experiments (see “Results”).
To ensure that infants had sufficient exposure to the events to understand that the agents had the goal of col-
lecting the reward by physically intuitive/counterintuitive methods, we applied the stimuli presentation scheme 
based on previous  studies16,17,46. Specifically, each event repeated for a minimum of two trials and a maximum 
of four trials. Because there would be individual differences regarding whether and when to lose interest in the 
familiarization events, the end of the familiarization depended on whether the infant looked away from the 
screen: the events were repeated twice for each agent, then further repeated until the infant either looked away 
from the screen for 2 s or watched each video 4 times.
The sequence was fixed, beginning with the physically intuitive events (or the corresponding events in con-
trol experiments, e.g., inefficient events). This was to enhance the violation of intuition: presenting the intuitive 
event in the first trial was intended to habituate infants to expect that agents should move according to physical 
principles (e.g., with physical support).
For the test phase we followed previous infant’s studies testing infants’ expectation of hierarchical 
 relationships19,20,36. In all four experiments, the test trials were identical (see Movie S12). Each infant watched 
two test videos (counterbalanced; SI, Stimuli pattern) in which either one agent retrieved the reward, and the 
looking time was measured from the moment at which an agent obtained the reward.
Coding and analysis. The familiarization phase and the test phase were coded both online and offline to 
measure if infants looked away for 2 consecutive seconds from the screen (SI, Coding). The purpose of online 
coding was to manage the timing of experimental procedure. The coding was conducted independently by two 
different experimenters to ensure that they were blind to the experimental conditions. To measure the exact 
looking time for test trials, the video recordings of the experiments were coded offline again. Looking times dur-
ing the test event were measured as the time interval between the moment the agent took the reward (before the 
screen had paused) and the moment infants began to consecutively look away for 2 s or 60 s had elapsed from 
the time point when the screen had frozen. The maximum possible looking time was 64.35 s. Each video was 
coded frame-by-frame whether or not infants were looking at the screen. One coder coded all trials and another 
coder independently coded 50% of the trials. The interclass correlation of coders was 0.973 (95% CI 0.960–0.982, 
p < 0.001).
Looking time was log-transformed for data  analysis57. We conducted two-tailed t-test to test whether a 
significant difference in looking time can be observed between two test trials (either of the agents obtained the 
reward). Furthermore, we did not have (theoretical) hypothesis regarding the relationship between the order 
of the test trials/sex of participants and infants’ looking time during the test phase. We conducted exploratory 
analyses with analysis of variance (ANOVA) to confirm that these two factors did not influence the looking time 
(for results of the ANOVAs, see SI)17.
To confirm that infants were surprised more by the physically counterintuitive events than by the physically 
intuitive events in the familiarization phase, we investigated whether infants looked back to the caregiver’s face 
in more trials when they were watching physically counterintuitive events than physically intuitive events. Social 
looking has been proposed as a robust method of measuring surprise at violation of  expectations49,58. We used 
social looking because looking time was not appropriate to measure surprise for the current familiarization 
design (see SI for detailed explanations). Social looking was coded to measure whether infants looked back to 
bring the caregiver’s face into focal view in each familiarization  trial49,58. Two observers who were unaware of the 
aim of the study coded all the trials. The inter-observer agreement was 0.968 (95% CI 0.953–0.982; Gwet’s AC)59.
Data availability
The dataset is available as Supplementary Dataset.
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